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Abstract
This paper contrasts two metaphysical accounts of modality and properties: Modal Realism which 
treats possible entities as primitive; and Strong Dispositionalism in which metaphysical possibility 
and necessity are determined by actually existing dispositions or powers. I argue that Strong 
Dispositionalism loses its initial advantages of simplicity and parsimony over Modal Realism as it 
is extended and amended to account for metaphysical rather than just causal necessity. Furthermore,
to avoid objections to its material and formal adequacy, Strong Dispositionalism requires a richer 
fundamental ontology which it cannot explicate without appealing either to possible worlds or to an 
account of counterfactual truth conditions, both of which Strong Dispositionalism was intended to 
replace.
 
2From Possibility to Properties? 
Or from Properties to Possibility? 
Sophie R Allen
Quine’s argument in ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ illustrates an important interdependence: 
modality is required to individuate intensional entities – properties, meanings, concepts and the like 
– and intensionality is required to determine modality.1 Quine’s target was the logical empiricist 
project which sought to explain necessity entirely in terms of analyticity; the problem being that, 
according to Quine, one cannot explicate analyticity without appealing to modality, since sameness 
of meaning requires the necessary coextension of predicates. For logical empiricists, this circle is 
vicious and disastrous, but I will not be concerned with their fate here. What is less frequently noted
is that the interdependence to which Quine drew attention is also crucial for philosophers of a more 
realist persuasion, since it captures the close connection between two important metaphysical 
notions of properties, meanings or concepts on the one hand and possibility and necessity on the 
other. For realists, Quine’s circle need not be vicious since it marks ontological rather than 
epistemological interdependence, and it can be cured by ontological commitment to a primitive 
category or categories of entities which will serve to determine the rest. 
If the intensional entities in question are properties, then this allows two directions in 
which the metaphysical explanation can run: possibility may be taken as primitive and used to 
determine properties; or properties may be presupposed which serve to ground possibility. The 
former strategy underlies one of the most well-known contemporary accounts of modality, David 
Lewis’s Modal Realism. This takes possible individuals as primitive and uses these to ground 
possible worlds which, in turn, facilitate metaphysical accounts of properties, causation, the 
semantics of counterfactuals and more.2 On the other hand, the latter strategy has quite recently 
been proposed by supporters of a dispositional account of properties who take causal powers or 
dispositional properties as primitive and use these to provide truthmakers for modal claims.3 Unlike 
1 W V Quine ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, Philosophical Review (1951) 60: 20–43, reprinted in W V Quine, From 
a Logical Point of View (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953): 20–46. 
2 David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986). 
3 Supporters of dispositionalist accounts of modality include: C B Martin and John Heil, ‘The Ontological Turn’, 
Midwest Studies in Philosophy (1999) 23: 34–60; A R Pruss, ‘The actual and the possible’, in The Blackwell Guide 
to Metaphysics, ed. R M Gale (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002): 317–33; Alexander Bird, Nature’s Metaphysics (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007); Andrea Borghini and Neil E Williams, ‘A Dispositional Theory of Possibility’, 
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3Lewis’s account, such theories are actualist because possibility and necessity are entirely grounded 
in entities which exist in the actual world. Furthermore, one might call them ‘hardcore’ actualist 
theories because they aim to provide truthmakers for modal statements in terms of actual properties 
without first using these to derive possible worlds.4 Thus, hardcore actualists aim to avoid both the 
ontological extravagance of Modal Realism and the commitment of other actualists to abstract 
entities which play the role of possible worlds, such as world-books or sets of propositions,5 thereby
providing a naturalistic account of modality if the world can be naturalistically understood. 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the prospects of hardcore actualism providing a 
viable account of modality; that is, whether it is plausible to think that properties determine 
possibility. To do so, I will concentrate upon one of the more thoroughly formulated versions of 
hardcore actualism known as ‘Strong Dispositionalism’ in which metaphysical possibility and 
necessity are grounded in the powers or dispositional properties of actual individuals.6 I will argue 
that once this theory has been formulated so that it avoids some rather obvious objections, the 
intuitively attractive actualist ontology with which it began has been complicated to the extent that 
it forfeits its advantages over its main rival, Modal Realism. 
In what follows, I will draw upon Modal Realism to make a comparative assessment of the
plausibility of Strong Dispositionalism. This strategy is not intended to suggest that Modal Realism 
is the only alternative to Strong Dispositionalism on offer, nor even that it is the most viable one; 
there are plenty of objections to Modal Realism which I will leave undiscussed. Nevertheless, the 
centrality of Modal Realism in much contemporary philosophical thought makes it a good metric 
against which to compare this novel proposal which is formulated so differently. Theoretical 
comparisons of the type I will make are useful in metaphysics, since they give us an indication of 
how much success to expect and how much ‘failure’ or obscurity to allow: it is usual to see how 
well a theory measures up to our pretheoretical desiderata but, because no theory does so perfectly, 
it is instructive to consider how well the theory does in comparison with other, more well-
established theories.
Dialectica 62 (2008): 21–41; Jonathan D Jacobs, ‘A powers theory of modality: or, how I learned to stop worrying 
and reject possible worlds’, Philosophical Studies 151 (2010): 227–248; Barbara Vetter, ‘Recent Work: Modality 
without Possible Worlds’, Analysis Reviews 71 (2011): 742–754; Potentiality: From Dispositions to Modality 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
4 The term ‘hardcore actualism’ is due to G. Contessa, ‘Modal Truthmakers and Two Varieties of Actualism’, 
Synthese 174 (2010): 341–353.
5 For a comprehensive discussion of non-hardcore actualism, see John Divers, Possible Worlds (London: Routledge, 
2002).
6 I will primarily draw upon the work of Vetter, op. cit., 2015, alongside Borghini and Williams op. cit. and Jacobs 
op. cit.. 
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4I will begin by sketching the main features of Modal Realism, in order to provide the basis 
for comparison, and introduce Strong Dispositionalism. I will then consider ways in which the 
ontology of dispositional properties is refined in order to avoid two objections: the first objection 
concerning the material adequacy of Strong Dispositionalism which maintains that there are 
intuitively plausible modal truths which lack dispositional truthmakers; and the second, concerning 
its formal adequacy which objects that Strong Dispositionalism is not a suitable basis for a plausible
version of modal logic. I will argue that although these objections can be avoided, the amendments 
required serve to complicate the theory and to make the entities which it employs more obscure. I 
will then investigate whether the Strong Dispositionalist can explicate her richer ontology, thereby 
rendering these amendments harmless, and conclude that it is difficult to see how she will be able to
do so without employing either the ontology of possible worlds or an account of counterfactual 
truth conditions, both of which Strong Dispositionalism was intended to replace. At best, Strong 
Dispositionalism loses the explanatory advantages it could initially claim over modal realism and 
has a lot of explanatory work still to do. At worst, Strong Dispositionalism cannot be coherently 
explicated except by appeal to ontology or to conceptual apparatus which it was formulated to 
avoid. 
1. From Possibility to Properties: Lewis’s Sales Pitch
Famously – or some might say ‘infamously’ – the modal realist regards non-actual, possible entities 
as existing in the same sense as actual ones.7 Possible worlds, including the one we call ‘the actual 
one’, consist in maximal spatio-temporally related individuals, they are maximal mereological sums
of the individuals at that world which are their parts. Furthermore, actuality is indexical: a world w 
is actual (and the other worlds possible) relative to the individuals in w. There are infinitely many of
these worlds, existing in spatio-temporal isolation from one other, and therefore individuals in one 
world cannot be in causal contact with those in others. This presents epistemological problems 
about the justification of modal claims if one considers that being in causal contact with something 
is a necessary condition for having knowledge or justified beliefs about it.8 But one need not think 
this, and it is open to the modal realist to develop alternative accounts of modal epistemology. 
7 David Lewis, Counterfactuals (Oxford: Blackwell, 1973), 85; op. cit., passim.
8 This condition is famously thought to make knowledge of abstract objects problematic. See Paul Benacerraf, ‘What 
numbers could not be’, Philosophical Review 74 (1965): 47–73; ‘Mathematical Truth’, The Journal of Philosophy 
70 (1973): 661–679. I will predominantly be concerned with ontological rather than epistemological matters in this 
paper. 
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5Lewis recommends accepting what seems to be an ontologically extravagant theory for the 
philosophical work that it does: according to him, the explanatory benefits make the ontological 
costs worthwhile. The principle benefits claimed for Modal Realism are as follows9: First, the 
modal realist’s fundamental ontology of spatio-temporally related individuals and sets is clear and 
precise (if we allow, for a moment, the indulgence that these include possible but non-actual 
individuals); in Lewis’s terminology, it is ‘safe and sane’.10 Second, this ontology of individuals and
sets can provide set-theoretic identity criteria for abundant properties and for propositions. 
Properties can be identified with sets of actual and possible individuals, while propositions can be 
identified with the sets of possible worlds at which they are true. Thus, constitutive identity criteria 
(which prove impossible to formulate set-theoretically in an ontology which includes only actual 
entities11) are available to the modal realist, making a form of class nominalism about properties 
viable once again. Additional categories, such as meanings, may be rehabilitated on the basis of the 
respectability of these entities. For philosophers who consider the provision of constitutive identity 
criteria for a category of entities to be important, and to offer an insight into the general nature of 
the members of that category, this feature of modal realism is an important one because it 
legitimizes a range of intensional entities which would otherwise be regarded as slightly mysterious.
Third, modal realism aims to be reductive: modal operators can be eliminated in favour of 
quantification over possible worlds. Fourth, modal realism offers a wide modal range: in addition to
the worlds in which the properties of this, the actual, world are distributed differently but still 
behave as they do in this world, there are metaphysically possible worlds in which the actual laws 
of nature are false, and perhaps (contra Lewis) worlds which are even stranger with respect to the 
actual one; for instance, worlds which differ in the logical laws they involve or which contain 
‘impossible’ entities.12 Fifth, the ontology provides truthmakers for modal statements including 
counterfactuals, thereby facilitating a counterfactual account of causality and a way of explaining 
causal laws. 
9 Given that this paper is primarily a critique of Strong Dispositionalism, I will not examine whether modal realism 
lives up to the claims which I make for it here. Importantly, if it does not, Strong Dispositionalism’s position will be
comparatively better. See Divers op. cit..
10 The term ‘safe and sane’ originates with Lewis (op. cit. 1986, 141, 143, 155) and has been employed in 
metaphysical discussions of modality since.
11 See Quine op. cit., 31 and ‘On the individuation of attributes’ in Theories and Things (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1981): 100–112; David Armstrong, Universals and Scientific Realism vol. 1: Nominalism and 
Realism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978): 28-43 for famous counterexamples to this thesis.
12 For modal realism about metaphysically ‘impossible’ worlds, see T. Yagisawa, ‘Beyond Possible Worlds’, 
Philosophical Studies 53 (1988): 175–204. For difficulties with this view and with unrestricted modal range more 
generally, see Sophie R Allen, ‘Curiosity kills the categories: a dilemma about categories and modality’, 
Metaphysica 16: 211–30.
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6Since my primary interest in this paper is not modal realism but a theory which contrasts 
with it, I will not evaluate these purported advantages here. But taken at face value, modal realism 
offers a host of explanatory benefits in return for the ontological commitment it requires. What does
Strong Dispositionalism have to offer in its place?
2. From Properties to Possibility
In contrast to Modal Realism, Strong Dispositionalism grounds modality in a very different way. 
The basic ontological category employed is that of causal powers or dispositional properties, fine-
grained entities which have their causal roles essentially. (I will use ‘power’, ‘causal power’, 
‘dispositional property’ and ‘disposition’ synonymously in what follows. I will reserve ‘potentiality’
which appears later for more specific use.) A power just is the capacity to bring about a certain 
manifestation or effect, or else the power to bring about that manifestation given the appropriate 
stimulus or when instantiated in combination with reciprocal partner powers. Thus, even if a certain
power remains unmanifested by the individual which instantiates it, that power determines what that
individual could do, would do and must do in different conditions.13 
Aside from the question of whether such essentially causal or modal properties are 
acceptable – which I will take, for the purposes of this paper, to be settled in the affirmative14 – 
there are further points of disagreement between dispositionalists themselves about the nature of 
powers. One important difference of opinion concerns whether uninstantiated powers exist; that is, 
whether powers should be treated as Platonic transcendent universals which exist even if they are 
uninstantiated,15 or whether we should adopt an Aristotelian conception of powers, such that powers
exist if and only if they are instantiated.16 The former Platonic conception affords a far broader 
13 Kit Fine (‘Essence and Modality’ Philosophical Perspectives 8 (1994): 1-16; Modality and Tense (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005)) argues for a slightly different hardcore actualist account of modality, using essences 
instead of dispositional properties to ground modality. I will not debate the relative merits of Fine’s essentialist 
modality versus dispositionalism here, although further discussion of this point can be found in Barbara Vetter, 
‘Essence and Potentiality’ MS academia.edu.  
14 For arguments in favour of a dispositionalist conception of properties see, for example, Sidney Shoemaker, 
‘Causality and Properties’, in Peter van Inwagen, ed. Time and Cause (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1980): 109–35; 
Stephen Mumford, Dispositions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); George Molnar, Powers: a study in 
metaphysics (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003); Alexander Bird, Nature’s Metaphysics (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2007); Alastair Wilson, ‘Schaffer on laws of nature’ Philosophical Studies 164 (2013): 653–667; 
and against, see Jonathan Schaffer, ‘Quiddistic knowledge’ Philosophical Studies 123 (2005): 1–32.
15 Bird op. cit. holds a restricted version of this view. See note 16.
16 The instantiation here is tenseless: a property exists if and only if it has been, is, or will be, instantiated in space-
time.
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7range of actually existing powers, since powers may actually exist although they are never 
instantiated by any actual individual (even in the sense of their being instantiated without 
manifesting). Perhaps, for instance, there is a power analogous to gravity which makes massive 
objects repel each other, a power which is never instantiated by any actual individual but which 
according to the Platonic version of dispositionalism actually exists.17 On the other hand, the 
supporter of the Aristotelian conception of powers rejects such uninstantiated, alien powers, 
although she accepts that certain instantiated powers exist unmanifested. 
Although Platonic actualism offers a greater range of possibilities than Aristotelianism, it 
does so by treating powerful properties as abstract entities, entities which are aspatial and (most 
probably18) atemporal. Moreover, since the modal strength of powers to manifest further powers is 
presumed to obtain on the basis of their intrinsic natures, the Platonic conception of powers also 
requires that there be necessary causal connections between abstract powers, rather than their 
instantiations, which further complicates the theory.19 Like Modal Realism’s possible worlds, 
abstract entities bring their own metaphysical and epistemic challenges and so Strong 
Dispositionalism would be in a comparatively stronger position if abstracta were not presupposed 
specifically to ground modality. Furthermore, on an Aristotelian conception of powers, Strong 
Dispositionalism would be able to provide an entirely naturalistic or physicalist account account of 
modality should naturalism or physicalism be true. With this in mind, I will begin by presuming 
Aristotelianism about powers and require that actual powers respect the Principle of Instantiation: 
only those powers which are instantiated by actual individuals exist. 
Although the foregoing paragraph appears to suggest that powers are universals, one does 
not need to accept this view. One could alternatively maintain that powers are tropes, or that they 
are primitive property-like entities which cannot be analysed further. Any plausible account of the 
ontological basis of properties is open to the strong dispositionalist with the only restriction being 
that one would have to avoid any account of objective similarity and difference which requires 
17 There is room for the Platonists to disagree about which uninstantiated powers exist. For instance, one might 
restrict the range of powers to those which could be instantiated alongside those which actually are and resist alien 
universal powers which could never be instantiated by actual individuals. (One might do this to account for the fact 
that certain determinate quantities of a determinable, such as mass, are not actually instantiated.) However, in the 
context of grounding modality, one might prefer a wider range of powers in order to ground a wider range of 
possibilities and thus include alien powers among the universal powers which exist. Since I will concentrate upon 
the Aristotelian conception, I will not examine these options here.
18 For a notable exception, see Quentin Smith, ‘Absolute Simultaneity and the Infinity of Time’, in Robin Le 
Poidevin, ed., Questions of Time and Tense (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998): 135–183.
19 While Plato accepted the existence of causal relations between abstract forms, it is not popular among 
contemporary philosophers. See for instance Phaedo, 96a, 97c-d.
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8modal realism. So, for instance, one could not ground powers by appealing to certain versions of 
resemblance nominalism for either individuals or tropes.20 
The dispositionalist exploits the natural modal force inherent in dispositional properties in 
order to provide an account of ways the world might be, might have been or must be. For instance, 
it is possible that the glass I am drinking from will break, it is possible that this paper was written in
German rather than English, and it is necessary that the ice cube in my water will melt at room 
temperature. While the modal realist grounds these claims in the existence of possibilia, the strong 
dispositionalist maintains that all such truths about possibility and necessity are determined by the 
existence of powers. 
To put the account into formal terms, the strong dispositionalist makes two related claims: 
POSS:  ♢ p  ∃φ ›[p](φ)
It is possible that P if and only if there exists a power Φ to bring it about that P 
NEC:  □ p  ¬∃φ ›[¬ p](φ)
It is necessary that P if and only if there is no power to bring it about that P is not the case.
(where ‘›[p](φ)’ is shorthand for ‘φ is the power to bring about p’)21 
The advantage claimed by the dispositionalist is that an account of possibility and 
necessity can be given solely on the basis of actual entities, the powerful properties which exist in 
the actual world. Such an account of modality is not only set apart from Modal Realism in its 
commitment to actualism, but also because of the nature of powers it is non-reductive. The natural 
modal force inherent in powers which makes causal processes occur when such powers are 
instantiated in the appropriate circumstances is treated as a primitive in the theory, not open to 
further analysis. The truth conditions of de dicto necessity and possibility are grounded by 
objectively existing modality in the world. 
Does this failure to provide a reductive account of modality count against Strong 
Dispositionalism? On this point, it is best for the strong dispositionalist – in fact, any 
20 For instance, the Resemblance Nominalism in Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra’s Resemblance Nominalism (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002) or Resemblance Class Trope Nominalism, as discussed in Douglas Ehring, Tropes: 
Properties, Objects and Mental Causation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
21 The formal versions are due to David Yates, ‘Dispositionalism and the Modal Operators’, Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 91 (2015): 414. Since NEC and POSS are interdefinable, we need only one of them. I 
have chosen a version of dispositionalism which quantifies over powers and not over the individuals which have 
them (pace Vetter, 2015 op. cit.), since this allows the theory to account for a wider range of possibilities from the 
outset. For instance, it is more plausible to think that the possibility that this paper was written in German rather 
than in English is determined by powers instantiated by its author (me) and my environment and history, rather than
by powers which the paper itself instantiates. 
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9dispositionalist – to remain unrepentant. Accepting that causal powers exist involves denying the 
Humean claim that there are no necessary connections between distinct individuals. Reduction of 
modality is not required because natural necessity is an intrinsic feature of powers or dispositional 
properties, entities which are thought by the dispositionalist to exist anyway and which have not 
been postulated specifically for the purpose of providing truthmakers for modal statements. 
Furthermore, the strong dispositionalist urges, these powers are neither ontologically nor 
epistemologically mysterious, despite the long history of suspicion about the existence of such 
entities due to the empiricist worry that we cannot have experiential evidence of what something 
could or must do, only what it actually does. (If there are dispositional properties such as solubility 
and fragility in nature at all, the empiricist tends to think, then they are reducible to categorical, or 
non-dispositional bases, or else statements about them can be translated into counterfactual 
conditionals.22) It is an overly strong version of empiricism, the dispositionalist argues, that 
precludes our being justified in believing that a sugar cube is could dissolve even though we have 
not put it in water, or that the wine glass is breakable, even though we have not yet thrown it onto a 
stone floor. We encounter such dispositional properties in our ordinary experience of the world 
because we are in causal contact with them, and so the epistemic difficulties associated with our 
finding out about the non-actual but possible entities of modal realism do not arise. Once we have 
abandoned strict empiricism, the acceptance of necessity in nature does not seem so odd.
These considerations about the ubiquity of causal powers are also brought to bear on 
another difference between Strong Dispositionalism and Modal Realism: unlike the latter, the 
former does not claim to have clear, independent constitutive identity criteria for the fundamental 
ontology of its theory. Powers or dispositional properties are individuated by their manifestations, 
or by their respective stimuli and manifestations,23 but in both cases this involves their being 
individuated by another power or powers. There are no non-circular identity criteria to be had. 
However, the dispositionalist can argue that identity criteria are not required to legitimize her 
ontology. Although, as the empiricists recognised, the modal nature of powers is not part of our 
ordinary experience, powers themselves enter into causal relations with us. More controversially, 
one might contend that first person experience of our own abilities and dispositions can give us an 
22 Nelson Goodman, Fact, Fiction and Forecast (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954); Elizabeth Prior, 
Dispositions (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1985); David Lewis, ‘Finkish Dispositions’, The Philosophical
Quarterly 47 (1997): 143–158; D H Mellor, ‘The Semantics and Ontology of Dispositions’, Mind 109 (2000): 757–
780. 
23 Individuation by manifestations alone is preferred by Strong Dispositionalists about modality. See Borghini and 
Williams op. cit., 24, 27 and Vetter op. cit., 2015, 35 and ch. 3 passim. For simplicity, I will not discuss Borghini 
and Williams’ distinction between dispositions and dispositional properties since nothing in my argument depends 
upon this.
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insight into the intrinsic nature of dispositions.24 Furthermore, one might argue that the Quinean 
demand for identity criteria for every ontological category is too strong25, and that the provision of 
constitutive identity criteria should only be a requirement in cases where the entities in question are 
abstract, or causally isolated from us in other ways such as Lewis’s non-actual possible worlds. 
Although identity criteria might be methodologically useful, one might object that they are not 
required in the case of powers, especially on the Aristotelian conception of them. Because the 
powers it postulates are familiar to us from everyday experience, Strong Dispositionalism does not 
have to match Modal Realism in this respect.
One clear advantage which Strong Dispositionalism can claim over Modal Realism is that, 
for the most part, possibilities are determined locally: what a thing could do is determined by the 
powers which that particular thing has. Thus, for instance, it is possible that the water glass on my 
desk will break because the glass is fragile and fragility is a disposition which will make it the case 
that the glass breaks if struck with the requisite force. Not only is this localized modal power in line 
with our intuitions, but it also ensures that Strong Dispositionalism is not susceptible to what has 
become known as Kripke’s ‘Humphrey objection’ which is brought against modal realism and its 
denial of transworld identity in favour of counterparts.26 The modal realist says that it is possible 
that Humphrey rather than Nixon won the 1968 US presidential election because there is a possible 
world in which a counterpart of Humphrey won the election. But, the objection goes, it does not 
matter to Humphrey (or anyone else) that someone very much like him won the election (in fact, 
that a lot of people very much like him won the election) because these counterpart people are not 
Humphrey himself. For the modal realist, the possibility of Humphrey’s winning has nothing to do 
with the actual individual Humphrey. On the other hand, for the strong dispositionalist, the 
possibility that Humphrey won the election is grounded by properties which Humphrey actually 
instantiated; the possibility can be traced to what the actual Humphrey was like. One need not, of 
course, be a strong dispositionalist to solve or avoid the Humphrey Objection: one can retain modal 
realism and permit (pace Lewis) transworld identity, or else another non-dispositionalist version of 
actualism will make it the case that the possibility of Humphrey winning is grounded in the actual 
Humphrey. However, it is significant that Strong Dispositionalism can respect the intuition that 
24 I will not rely upon establishing this point. Not only would one have to argue that we do indeed have first person 
experience of instantiating dispositions as agents, one would also have to affirm that this conception generalises to 
properties which are not a matter of our direct subjective experience. See Stephen Mumford and Rani Lil Anjum, 
Getting Causes from Powers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 176. 
25 W V Quine, ‘On what there is’, Review of Metaphysics 5 (1948): 21-38, reprinted in W V Quine, From a Logical 
Point of View (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953): 1–19; ‘Ontological Relativity’, in Ontological 
Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969): 28–68.
26 Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980): 45, note 13.
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what a thing can or must do is determined by something about it, rather than by entities with which 
it is in no causal contact such as non-actual possible individuals, or abstracta.
To summarise, Strong Dispositionalism shares Modal Realism’s explanatory power in the 
sense that it provides an account of the truth conditions of counterfactuals and modal claims, and 
the ontology of powers can be employed to provide an account of causality and also of natural 
laws.27 The account of modality on offer is localized, actualist and will also be naturalistic if the 
world is. Where the theories differ is in their formulation: Strong Dispositionalism is neither 
reductive nor provides identity criteria for the fundamental entities it employs. But crucially, it is in 
virtue of the very nature of those entities that the strong dispositionalist can claim that she does not 
need to meet such requirements in order to make her ontology ‘safe and sane’: irreducibly modal 
powers are part of what we experience in the world.
3. Some refinements to Strong Dispositionalism
So far, the ontology of powers or dispositional properties has a good prospect of providing an 
account of natural, causal or nomic necessity.28 Dispositional properties are, as we currently 
understand them, paradigmatically causal entities and it is because of intuitions surrounding the 
natural necessity which accompanies causal processes that powers provide a plausible actualist 
account of causal modality. But the strong dispositionalist wants more than this. In particular, she 
wants to give an account of metaphysical necessity and possibility, not merely the more restrictive 
causal or nomic necessity, without thereby giving a deflationary account of metaphysical modality 
which claims that metaphysically possibility is nothing more than either what is causally possible or
what is possible according to the laws of nature (if these are different). But are there enough 
dispositional properties to ground this broader modal range?
There are two immediate challenges for the Strong Dispositionalist, both of which arise 
from the concern that there are not enough powers to ground every metaphysical possibility and 
necessity. The first problem arises from concerns about the material adequacy of Strong 
Dispositionalism: there are some intuitively plausible modal truths which appear to lack actual 
truthmakers of either the dispositional or non-dispositional variety.  The second challenge arises 
27 Stephen Mumford, Laws in Nature (London: Routledge, 2004); Bird, op. cit.; Wilson, op. cit.
28 I shall, for the purposes of this paper, assume that the dispositionalist can at least do this. However, for an argument 
against the view that dispositional properties produce their manifestations as a matter of necessity, see Mumford 
and Anjum, op. cit., 8.2. which might undermine the project to employ powers to ground modality. Their conclusion
is challenged in Vetter op. cit. 2015, 92–3; Anna Marmadoro, ‘Dispositional Modality vis-à-vis Conditional 
Necessity’ Philosophical Investigations 39 (2015): 205–14. 
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because some truths appear to have non-dispositional truthmakers and this threatens the formal 
adequacy of Strong Dispositionalism; that is, whether it can be used as the basis for a plausible 
version of formal modal logic. I will argue that although the strong dispositionalist can meet both of
these challenges, she does so at the cost of postulating increasingly implausible actual powers. 
These create further problems with formal adequacy and they introduce an additional dimension of 
ontological complexity which may be impossible to explain without recourse to non-dispositional 
accounts of modality.
3.1 Material Adequacy
Are there enough powers instantiated by actual individuals to ground every metaphysically possible
truth, and every metaphysically necessary one? The problem of material adequacy can be 
distinguished into two problems of differing levels of severity, a local problem and a more general 
one: first, there may be metaphysical possibilities for which the requisite truthmaking powers are 
not instantiated among the individuals or environment to which the possibilities pertain; second, 
there may be metaphysical possibilities requiring alien powers which (perhaps) could never be 
instantiated by actual individuals. I will concentrate upon the former, local problem, although I will 
also touch upon the latter. The reason for this bias is that initially it is more important for the strong 
dispositionalist to solve the former problem because with the latter she could simply bite the bullet 
and argue that such alien powers do not exist. It is prima facie acceptable for actualists to deny that 
the range of genuine possibilities is as wide as the modal realist would insist.29 There may be, for 
instance, no genuine counterlegal possibilities which could only be actualized were the actual laws 
of nature false.
Even disregarding the possibilities grounded in alien powers, there is still a problem with 
material adequacy. As it stands, Strong Dispositionalism faces some obvious counterexamples. For 
instance, take the following sentences:
i) It is possible that my eldest great grand-daughter is a famous mathematician.
ii) It is possible that I’m a Wing Chun Master.
iii) It is possible that the Golden Gate Bridge melts.
29 For instance, see Borghini and Williams, op. cit. 35–40; Wilson op. cit.; Vetter, op. cit. 2015, 267–273. 
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All of these statements appear not to have actual powers which make them true, but we would 
intuitively judge that they are all true metaphysical possibilities. Fortunately, strong dispositionalists
have suggested ways to account for metaphysical possibilities such as these by expanding or 
enriching the ontology of actual powers.
The first method deals with examples such as (i). It is possible that my eldest great grand-
daughter is a famous mathematician even though I have no great grand-daughters and may never 
have any. However, this seems to be a genuine possibility and, even by strict actualist lights, it 
seems very plausible to think that the world currently contains powers which could bring (i) about. 
To see how this could occur we need to think in terms of the powers which actually manifesting 
powers might bring about, and the powers which these powers might bring about, and so on. In 
other words, we need to think in terms of iterated or higher order powers.30 
Borghini and Williams suggest a way to rank this hierarchy, ensuring that it is grounded in 
powers which are actually manifested in the world. If we treat the actually instantiated powers as 
first order, we can rank the powers which these first order powers have the power to produce as 
second order, the powers which second order powers have the power to produce as third order, and 
so on.31 Iterated powers deal adequately with future possibilities in which the individual involved 
does not yet exist (and may never exist), such as the possibility of my eldest great grand-daughter 
being a famous mathematician, because actually instantiated powers have the power to bring about 
powers which bring about powers and so on... that I have a grand-daughter and that she is a famous 
mathematician. Furthermore, higher-order powers can deal with possibilities which will never be 
actualized, such as the possibility of my being a Wing Chun Master. There are actually instantiated 
powers which could have brought about my having the power to be one, or else instantiated powers 
to bring the former powers about, thus I possess a higher-order power to become a Wing Chun 
Master after all. Lack of training, talent and patience, in addition to the failure of a long chain of 
favourable conditions to manifest, means that the power to be a Wing Chun Master remains 
unmanifested by me, but the higher-order power nevertheless grounds the possibility that I could 
have become one and this higher-order power ultimately exists in virtue of first-order powers. 
Higher-order powers broaden the range of possibilities which the strong dispositionalist can account
30 I will use these terms interchangeably.
31 op. cit. 30–1. As Vetter notes, there is some confusion in Borghini and Williams’ text about the numbering and 
direction of the ordering (op. cit. 2015, 135, note 25). Since the question of where to start ordering is largely 
arbitrary, I will simply aim for consistency in what I say, rather than attempting to determine what Borghini and 
Williams intend to say.
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for by grounding every possibility which actually instantiated powers or combinations of them 
could bring about.  
How broad a range of possibility do iterated powers permit? This general question is both 
fascinating and difficult. Most higher order powers will also be actually instantiated as first order 
powers by other individuals, but some may not be: given the right combination of powers, the world
might have contained dragons, or Cartesian egos, or silicon-based life. Thus, iteration might 
facilitate an actualist account of merely possible entities. Furthermore, Borghini and Williams claim
that their account of possibility is not simply restricted to nomic possibility and necessity but is 
‘super-nomic’; novel laws of nature might be added to those which exist already, in virtue of the 
novel iterated powers, and new possibilities emerge. The question of the modal range that actual 
powers permit is complicated because it requires consideration of how properties can combine to 
produce novel properties, and exactly how ‘novel’ these are. Since, as I noted, the actualist 
dispositionalist can stand her ground against some general questions about material adequacy, I will
delay discussion of this matter for another time.
The possibility in (iii) of the Golden Gate Bridge melting cannot be dealt with by higher-
order powers and requires different treatment. Borghini and Williams argue that such possibilities 
are grounded by more specific, finely-grained powers. In (iii), the power to melt is instantiated by 
the bridge, and so it is first order, but simply calling this dispositional property ‘the power to melt’ 
is elliptical for the complicated set of conditions which would be involved in a steel bridge melting. 
However, it is not obvious how this strategy is to work in conjunction with Borghini and Williams’ 
claim that powers are to be individuated by their respective manifestations, rather than by their 
stimulus conditions and manifestations.32 The additional detail required to specify the Golden Gate 
Bridge’s power to melt and to differentiate it from the Bridge’s power to remain solid is not part of 
the former power’s manifestation – its melting –but part of the conditions required for the power to 
manifest, that is the stimulus conditions which must obtain. Borghini and Williams’ strategy to 
account for unlikely metaphysical possibilities is not compatible with their conception of powers or 
dispositions being individuated by their manifestations alone. Furthermore, individuating powers in 
a more specific and fine-grained way according to both stimulus and manifestation also 
distinguishes powers from each other in a way in which our ordinary modal statements do not. 
When we assert (iii), that it is possible for the Golden Gate Bridge to melt, we mean that it is 
possible that a process will occur which is basically the same as that which occurs when an ice cube
32 Borghini and Williams, op. cit. 24 and 27.  
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melts. The finer-grained individuation of powers would obscure this similarity: the power to bring 
about the melting of the Golden Gate Bridge would be a distinct power from that which brings 
about the melting of the ice cube, due to the difference in causal conditions required.
Vetter avoids this problem and pre-empts the localized material adequacy objection by 
characterising a slightly different conception of a power or disposition, a category of entities which 
she calls ‘potentialities’. Like powers, potentialities give an individual the power to do something, 
or to instantiate a further potentiality or potentialities (so there can be iterated potentialities), or to 
make a state of affairs come about; but unlike powers, potentialities are also possessed by 
individuals as a matter of degree. Thus, the Golden Gate Bridge instantiates the potentiality to melt 
to a minimal degree, while an ice cube instantiates it to a very high degree. Arguably, we can also 
explain some cases which employed iterated powers by appealing to potentialities being instantiated
by degrees: I might still be said to instantiate the potentiality to be a Wing Chun Master to a 
minimal degree because were I to take up training now (and a host of favourable circumstances 
transpired), the possibility of my becoming a Wing Chun Master could be actualized. 
Does it matter that accepting both iterated potentialities and potentialities had by degrees 
might provide more than one set of truthmakers for some possibility claims? I think that it does not 
because one can argue that it allows us to explain the different senses in which assertions about 
possibility are made. Currently, there is a very slim possibility that I could actually become a Wing 
Chun Master, grounded by the potentiality I have to become one which I possess to a minimal 
degree; while the possibility of my being a Wing Chun Master is also grounded in another sense by 
potentialities I previously instantiated to a high degree, which ground higher-order potentialities 
that I became one. These are ways the world could have been which will not be actualized. 
Explanation in terms of iterated potentialities does not conflict with explanation in terms of 
potentialities had as a matter of degree.
3.2 Formal Adequacy
If Strong Dispositionalism is to provide a competitive account of modality, then it should be able to 
form the basis of a plausible formal modal logic. Otherwise, formal theories based upon possible 
world semantics will remain the standard and Strong Dispositionalism will be, at best, a 
metaphysical sideshow. I will raise two difficulties concerning formal adequacy, although there are 
others. 
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The first problem arises if any actual truths are made true by properties which are non-
dispositional. Consider the following three examples:
iv) Individual c is square.
v)  2 + 3 = 5
vi) The Golden Gate Bridge is either dancing or not dancing.
First, it will seem plausible to those who are not committed to pan-dispositionalism about 
properties that sentences (iv)-(vi) are made true by properties which are not dispositional but 
categorical; that is, they are qualitative properties which do not have their causal or modal power 
essentially. In this instance, these would be the properties of being square, mathematical properties 
such as adding up to 5, and the property of either dancing or not dancing. 
Second, although there are different ways of formulating formal systems of modal logic, 
certain axioms are widely considered to be crucial, among which is Axiom (T) that if P is true, then 
it is possible that P:
(T)  |- p   p 
However, if the truthmakers for (iv)-(vi) are not dispositional, then there are actualized 
possibilities which appear to lack dispositional truthmakers, and so are not possible according to 
POSS which holds that it is possible that P if and only if there is a potentiality to make it the case 
that P. Thus, ‘Individual c is square’ is true, but ‘It is possible that individual c is square’ is false, 
and so Axiom (T) turns out to be false.33
Given that Axiom (T) is widely considered to be essential for a plausible system of modal 
logic, this outcome would be a disaster for Strong Dispositionalism. The strong dispositionalist 
needs a remedy and there are three which would preserve her position.34 First, she might insist that 
there are powers or potentialities to ground possibilities alongside categorical properties; for 
instance, that there is a power to make it the case that c is square which determines the truth of the 
33 Yates argues that axiom (K) |- □(p  q)  (□p  □q) fails for the same reason as (T). I will not consider this 
problem separately since it can be rectified by the best response I suggest to preserve (T) which is to insist that all 
truthmaking properties are dispositional. op. cit. 2015, 414–5.  
34 David Yates urges the strong dispositionalist to admit defeat at this point, on the basis of examples such as (iv)-(vi), 
and proposes an account he calls ‘Weak Dispositionalism’ which amends POSS and NEC to: 
POSS (Weak):   ♢ p  {p v ∃φ›[p](φ)} 
NEC (Weak):  □ p  {p &  ¬ ∃φ›[¬ p](φ)}.
Since my concern is the defence of Strong Dispositionalism, I will not explore this proposal here, although Yates’ 
mixed account potentially requires different truthmakers for some contingent truths and the possibilities associated 
with them. Thus his view would be susceptible to criticisms of the mixed truthmaker solution in the present 
paragraph. Yates, op. cit. 419.
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proposition ‘It is possible that c is square’. However, postulating such a power just to make POSS 
true seems ad hoc and also leaves the strong dispositionalist in a peculiar situation with respect to 
the truthmakers of (T). In some cases at least, the antecedent of (T) is made true by a different 
truthmaker to the consequent (the categorical property being square and the power to bring it about
that something is square) with no clear ontological relationship between them. To counter this, the 
strong dispositionalist might secondly argue that the power to bring it about that something is 
square is also a truthmaker for the actual truth that ‘c is square’, but that move seems ontologically 
uneconomical, and again – given that there is a categorical property as a truthmaker already – rather
ad hoc. The existence of purely qualitative, categorical properties creates problems for strong 
dispositionalism, even if such properties are not thought to play a role as truthmakers in non-actual 
modal truths. In light of these points, the third, remaining move is the most plausible one for the 
strong dispositionalist: commit to a pan-dispositionalist ontology, one in which all properties have 
their dispositional natures essentially. 
There are various ways in which one might accept pan-dispositionalism and yet allow a 
place for paradigmatically categorical properties. For instance, one might characterise ‘categorical’ 
properties as powers which are constantly manifesting,35 or else take a dual aspect view of 
properties36: for instance, that being square is the manifested qualitative aspect of a property which 
is also essentially dispositional. Vetter’s preferred solution again exploits potentialities which are 
instantiated by degrees: the powers which are always manifesting are potentialities which are 
instantiated to a maximal degree. However, although this approach deals with the paradigmatically 
categorical properties which would otherwise cause trouble for dispositionalism, such as (arguably) 
being square, or being red, it will not on its own resolve cases which involve necessary truths such 
as ‘2+3=5’ or ‘The Golden Gate Bridge is dancing or it is not dancing’. There is a further difficulty 
concerning which actual entities instantiate these continuously manifesting potentialities such as 
those which act as truthmakers for (v) and (vi). 
In the case of potentialities which ground logically necessary truths such as (vi), the 
answer to this question may have to be that everything instantiates such potentialities to the 
maximal degree. This strategy countenances an abundance of potentialities which manifest all the 
time. Although this may be acceptable in the case of logical potentialities – perhaps we might 
regard logical potentialities as somehow derived from the distribution in individuals of more prosaic
35 Andreas Hüttemann, ‘A disposition-based process-theory of causation’ in Stephen Mumford and Matthew Tugby, 
eds. Metaphysics of Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013): 101-122. 
36 Robert Schroer, ‘Can a single property be both dispositional and categorical? The “Partial Consideration Strategy” 
partially considered’, Metaphysica 14 (2013): 63-77.
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potentialities, such as the potentiality to melt, or to dance, and so on – it is not an attractive option 
in the case of mathematical potentialities; we do not want to have to say that everything has the 
continuously manifesting potentiality to make 2+3=5 (and every other mathematical truth).
A very vague answer which the strong dispositionalist can give is that something but not 
everything instantiates such dispositions.37 A more specific answer might, in the case of 
mathematical truths, point towards the various different accounts of mathematical ontology on offer.
Depending upon what one thinks that numbers are, one might think that the potentialities for 
numbers to enter into relationships with one another are instantiated by those entities, and that they 
manifest such dispositions continuously (to use Hüttemann’s terminology). If one thinks that 
numbers are abstract objects for instance, it seems plausible enough to say that the powers of 2, 3 
and 5 combine to make it the case that 2+3=5. This would involve, of course, it being plausible that 
abstracta can instantiate dispositional properties, and while the Platonist about powers would have 
no difficulty with this shift to potentialities being instantiated by abstract entities, it is not clear 
whether it is compatible with the Aristotelian conception of powers. Alternatively, if one thinks that 
the ontology of mathematics is somehow determined by concrete, spatio-temporally located entities,
then one might think that mathematical truths are made true by the potentialities of those spatio-
temporally located things, or by iterated potentialities of those things.38 
I will not undertake a full survey of the options for mathematical ontology due to 
limitations of space, but it seems clear that at least some accounts of what numbers are would 
permit one to say what it is which instantiates the potentiality to make mathematical statements true 
(and ensures that there is no power to make them false, thereby making them necessary). The strong
dispositionalist can save Axiom (T).  
A second point of contention concerning the formal adequacy of modal logic based on 
potentialities concerns Axiom (S4), if it is possible that it is possible that P, then it is possible that 
P:
(S4)  |-  p   p
Given POSS, the possibility of P requires there being a power or a potentiality to bring P about, and 
so the possibility of the possibility requires a potentiality to bring about a potentiality that P. Given 
the introduction of higher order potentialities, we can make sense of the existence of potentialities 
to bring about other potentialities, but it seems highly implausible to say that the existence of a 
37 A reply given in a paper by Vetter on 26th November 2014, University of Oxford.
38 However, this kind of broadly physicalist view of mathematical ontology is rare. See J S Mill, A System of Logic 
Book II (London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1843): Chapters 5 and 6.
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higher order potentiality implies the existence of one of a lower order. For instance, I have the (at 
least) second order potentiality to speak Kurdish, on the basis of which we would be happy to say 
that it is metaphysically possible that I speak Kurdish. But I know no Kurdish words, nor grammar, 
nor do I have lessons nor a book to teach myself from: what grounds the second order potentiality is
that I instantiate first order potentialities to acquire each of those things. But that does not seem to 
be enough to say that I have the first order potentiality to speak Kurdish; that is a potentiality 
instantiated by my Kurdish-speaking colleague, but not by me.  
Vetter – the only strong dispositionalist to have taken the formalisation as far as to consider
the matter – seems unsure about whether to commit to an equivalent axiom for her system of 
potentiality.39 She accepts that (S4) does not hold when we consider whether the existence of 
potentialities to produce potentialities entails potentialities, but then she introduces a generalised 
conception of iterated potentialities – potentiality* – which pays no heed to the order of iteration. 
Thus, she argues that having the potentiality* to produce the potentiality* to M entails having the 
potentiality* to M. Given her generalisation, this seems acceptable; but her generalisation to 
potentiality* does not seem acceptable because it only holds if we treat all orders (including first 
order) potentialities as simply ‘iterated’ potentialities (potentiality*), and this removes important 
information about the ultimate grounding of all potentiality in first order, actually instantiated 
potentialities. A precise assessment of Vetter’s position should be undertaken elsewhere, as I cannot 
do justice to it here, and it is enough for my argument to cast doubt upon the truth of (S4) given the 
account of higher order potentialities under consideration.
Unlike (T), the inclusion of (S4) is negotiable and some systems of formal modal logic do 
without it.40 However, if we take the ordering of higher order potentialities seriously and their being 
grounded by first order, actually instantiated ones is important, then it is not an acceptable move to 
remove the distinction between first order potentialities and the rest; but if we retain the distinction, 
we cannot admit (S4), since it would collapse all higher potentialities into first-order ones. 
4. Potentialities: a ‘safe and sane’ ontology?
From the preceding discussion, there are ways in which the strong dispositionalist can avoid 
objections about the material and formal adequacy of her theory. However, the fundamental 
category of entities which is employed has changed radically from its fairly intuitive beginnings: we
39 Vetter op. cit. 2015, 212.
40 Nathan Salmon, ‘The Logic of What Might Have Been’ Philosophical Review 98 (1989): 3–34.
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have moved from causal powers which were individuated by their manifestations, to potentialities 
which can be possessed as a matter of degree (and are individuated by both manifestation and 
degree), can be iterated or of higher orders, can be non-causal, can be continuously manifested and 
can be possessed by abstract objects. The ontologically richer category of potentialities is more 
abundant and more fine-grained, with many more potentialities instantiated by every actual 
individual than could be detected by ordinary experience or determined by experimentation. 
The first worry arising from this shift is that the admission of non-causal potentialities 
results in the loss of a key argument in favour of the dispositional conception of properties, and 
hence also in favour of Strong Dispositionalism. This argument is based upon the plausibility of 
constitutively identifying and individuating properties in terms of their causal or nomic roles, in the 
absence of other plausible criteria to do so.41 But it does not, of course, apply to non-causal 
potentialities, once these are postulated. The Strong Dispositionalist does not appear to have a good 
argument for extending the ontology to include these entities except for the fact that she wishes to 
give a uniform and actualist account of modality. A primary motivation for pan-dispositionalism has
been lost once non-causal potentialities are allowed.
A second worry is that the strong dispositionalist has also forfeited her justification for not 
having to provide identity and individuation criteria for the fundamental entities in her ontology. In 
addition to potentialities being individuated along a causal or qualitative dimension – there being 
different kinds of them according to their manifestations – the admission of degrees introduces 
another way in which potentialities may differ from each other. Since such entities were introduced 
to act as truthmakers for a huge range of rarely actualized possibilities, such as the possibility of the
Golden Gate Bridge’s melting, or its tasting of chocolate, such entities will not be part of our 
everyday experience of the world, nor is it obvious that an individual possesses such potentialities 
to a low degree on the basis of those potentialities which it actually manifests. Thus, the claim that 
we do not require identity criteria for potentialities because they are part of our everyday experience
is not plausible in the way that it was for powers.  
Potentialities might be exactly the right kind of property-like entities to ground modality, 
but as potentialities have been made ontologically richer than mere powers, they have become 
progressively less ‘safe and sane’ as an ontological category. Those who are concerned about 
admitting the modal realist’s possible but non-actual individuals which exist in the same sense as 
actual ones might be equally concerned about potentialities.
41  Shoemaker, op. cit.. For further discussion about the options for individuation, see S R Allen, A Critical 
Introduction to Properties (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), Ch. 5.
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This worry might be ameliorated if we had a better understanding of what it is for a 
potentiality to be possessed as a matter of degree, a question to which I will turn in the next section. 
5. How should we understand potentialities being possessed by degrees?
What can one say about what it means for a potentiality to be possessed to a degree? So far we have
only intuition and a few comparative examples:
a) The Golden Gate Bridge has a lower degree of potentiality to melt than an ice cube does.
b) 2+3 has a maximal potentiality to be identical to 5.
c) The kettle has a greater degree of potentiality to heat the water than the candle does.
d) The Golden Gate Bridge has a (rather) minimal degree of potentiality to taste of chocolate.
e) The electron has a maximal degree of potentiality to repel other electrons.
Vetter argues that the best way of understanding a maximal degree of potentiality is in terms of 
there not being a potentiality to do otherwise.42 If (b) and (e) are genuine examples of a potentiality 
being possessed to a maximal degree, then that is because there is no potentiality which grounds 2 
and 3 not being identical to 5 when added together, nor is there a potentiality which would ground 
an electron’s attracting other electrons. I will not contest this analysis because I think that the 
philosophical problems really start when one considers how we are to understand what grounds 
potentialities of intermediate degrees, and this has not yet been given a thorough explanation.43
There is an easy explanation, but it does not resolve the conceptual problem: in many 
cases, potentialities will be had to a specific degree by an individual because that individual has 
other potentialities (and so does its environment, if they are extrinsic potentialities) which ground 
the former ones. The Golden Gate Bridge has a low degree of potentiality to melt in situ and an 
even lower degree of potentiality to taste of chocolate because of other potentialities it has. But 
these grounding potentialities will also be instantiated to a certain degree, as will the potentialities 
which ground them. Either we eventually get to fundamental potentialities which are themselves 
instantiated to some degree or other (which can be explained no further)44, or the chain of grounding
42 op. cit. 2015, 86–92.
43 Vetter (ibid.) agrees that further explanation is required, but only hints at the correct analysis. Hence much of my 
discussion will proceed from first principles. 
44 There is disagreement over whether fundamental potentialities are instantiated to a maximal degree. Vetter, 
following Bird, suggests that they are; while Cartwright disagrees. In fact, explaining the degree to which higher 
level potentialities are possessed might be made easier if they were not. Ibid., 86; Bird, op. cit.; Nancy Cartwright, 
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continues indefinitely because the world is infinitely complex. Both horns of this dilemma result in 
a situation where being instantiated to a certain degree remains unexplained.
Given the examples (a)-(e) above, there are (at least) three ways of understanding a 
potentiality’s being possessed by a degree. Let us consider the options in terms of a comparative 
claim concerning two individuals, b and c.
An individual b possesses the potentiality to M to a greater degree than individual c does if and only
if
I) b manifests more M than c does
II) b manifests M more often than c does
III) b’s manifesting M is more likely than c’s manifesting M
Reading (I) would fit examples (a) and (c): the Golden Gate Bridge does begin the process of 
melting on a hot sunny day (the steel it is made of expands, at least) but it does not turn to liquid as 
an ice cube does. The candle flame heats the water a little bit, but not as much as the kettle does. 
The intensity of the respective potentialities varies in the different cases. This reading also fits some
of what Vetter says about degrees: ‘Typically, the disposition’s degree is (inversely) correlated with 
that of its stimulus. Thus, in general, a glass that is more fragile will break if struck with a lesser 
force, and one which is less fragile will break only if struck with a greater force.’45 So, given an 
exactly similar stimulus, the disposition with the greater degree would have a greater or more 
intense effect. 
However, one might worry that (I) does not permit a stable account of a potentiality being 
had to a maximal degree: there would have to be a maximal strength or intensity of a potentiality to 
permit this to occur and that is only likely in a few special cases in which the maximum strength of 
a physical or natural property has an upper limit. Example (e) is not, on this reading, true because 
something else (with a stronger charge) would repel an electron more strongly than another 
electron.
In addition, in mathematical examples such as (b), there would be no lesser degrees: what 
would it mean to say that something (anything) has lesser degree of potentiality to be identical with 
5 than 2+3 does? There would, in such cases, either be no potentiality to do so in an individual (or 
Nature’s Capacities and their Measurement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). It is difficult to resolve this 
dispute until we have a better idea of what a potentiality’s being possessed to a degree involves.
45 op. cit. 2015, 43. 
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group of entities) or a maximal degree, with no way of understanding the scale in between. Thus we
have a subset of potentialities which we cannot understand as being possessed as a matter of degree.
Reading (I) does not coherently capture degrees of potentialities; nevertheless, one might 
think that it does capture our intuitive understanding of a potentiality’s ‘being possessed to a certain 
degree’.46 However, the intuitive pull of (I) will be something of a drawback if we now opt for one 
of the other readings and yet cannot provide a full explanation of it.
Let us consider (II). Does b have the potentiality to M to a greater degree than c does if and
only if b manifests M more often than c does? The first thing to note is that ‘more often’ cannot 
literally be a claim about the behaviour of the potentiality as possessed by a particular b (say) 
because the manifestation of some potentialities is not repeatable in a particular. A glass breaks 
once (if at all) because it is fragile to a high degree, the glass does not break more often than a lump 
of lead. What we require to make sense of this reading is a claim generalized over similar 
individuals:
(A) Individuals intrinsically like b manifest M more often than those intrinsically like c in similar 
circumstances.
But (A) seems incorrect. If we keep the circumstances fixed, then an ice cube will melt on an 
ordinary Californian summer’s day and the Golden Gate Bridge will not, which (one might think) is
fine and fits our desired analysis. However, a bridge like the Golden Gate Bridge would never melt 
in such circumstances while an ice cube always will and so we have lost our desired notion of 
degrees. One might not think that this matters, except that a bridge like the Golden Gate Bridge 
would never melt in such circumstances nor would a granite bridge, and yet we would be inclined to
say that the granite bridge has a greater degree of potentiality to melt than the Golden Gate Bridge 
does. But there is nothing to ground the difference in degrees.47 
This problem of accounting for unactualized possibilities leads one to think that we need to
consider the range of circumstances in which b manifests M compared to c, and not merely consider
a specific context. This adjustment brings the reading (II) of ‘more often’ closer to (III) that b has 
46 This reading seems to be close to Mumford and Anjum’s conception of powers having intensity. They also call the 
intensity of a power its ‘degree’. op. cit. 2011, 24-26.
47 One might protest at this example on the basis of statistical thermodynamics: there is a minimal but non-negligible 
chance that the Golden Gate Bridge will melt, so it is incorrect to say that it will never melt on an ordinary 
California summer day. However, this minimal likelihood will also be true of the granite bridge and so the required 
contrast will not be captured except perhaps by consideration of counterfactual situations. If we consider actual 
bridges, there have been no cases of melting (at least none of which I am aware). Thus this analysis of degrees of 
potentialities would not be an actualist one.
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the potentiality to M to a higher degree than c if and only if it is more likely that b manifests M than 
it is that c does so. I will examine what remains of (II) together with (III). We could try to analyse 
(III) in two ways:
(B) b manifests M in a greater range of circumstances or causal contexts than c.
(C) Individuals intrinsically like b manifest M in a greater range of differing circumstances than 
individuals intrinsically like c.
Can we capture what is meant by ‘more often’ or ‘more likely’ with (B) that ‘b manifests 
M in a greater range of circumstances or causal contexts than c’? Again, we have the problem that 
the manifestation of the potentiality might not be repeatable; there is no way to make sense of the 
increased frequency of manifestation in such cases except by considering particulars similar to b. 
Otherwise, we will be forced to rely upon subjunctive conditionals of the form: ‘Were b to be in 
circumstances X (say), then b would manifest M.’ (Were the Golden Gate Bridge to be subjected to 
a temperature of 5000 degrees Celsius, it would melt.) Thus, we would be advised to opt for reading
(C). 
Secondly, even if the manifestation is repeatable by a particular b, a potentiality’s 
manifesting will be contingent upon whether or not b is ever in the appropriate circumstances to 
manifest M. We want to say that b could have potentiality F to a high degree even though b never 
actually manifests M at all because b is never in the right conditions. For instance, a particular sugar
cube has the potentiality to dissolve to a high degree even though it is never actually in contact with
liquid. If we want to capture this, we would again have to revert to subjunctive conditionals along 
the lines of ‘Were b and c to be in similar specific circumstances, b would manifest M more often 
than c would’. If this is true for all circumstances, then b has potentiality F to a higher degree than c
does. 
However, the problem in both these cases is that subjunctive and counterfactual 
conditionals have crept back into the analysis of what it is for a potentiality to be possessed as a 
matter of degree. But one of the advantages of Strong Dispositionalism was supposed to be that 
potentialities could ground the truth of counterfactuals, rather than counterfactuals being required to
ground potentialities and the degrees with which they are possessed. Nor (of course!) will it help to 
revert to a possible worlds analysis to give an account of whether b and/or c manifest M in different
situations, although that too would solve our problem. Understanding degrees according to (B) 
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seems to bring back the conceptual apparatus or the ontology that Strong Dispositionalism was 
intended to replace. 
Given the foregoing discussion, the reader might already suspect that I am not particularly 
optimistic about the prospects for (C). Recall that:
(C) Individuals intrinsically like b manifest M in a greater range of differing circumstances than 
individuals intrinsically like c.
However, it is not clear that we can rely upon the range of actual circumstances to make sense of 
the likelihood of a potentiality manifesting. Recall the example of the two bridges which prompted 
the rejection of (A) above: a granite bridge has a greater degree of potentiality to melt than the 
Golden Gate Bridge (and steel bridges like it) but the number of actual cases in which bridges of 
either variety have melted is zero (to the best of my knowledge). If we can’t bring in possible 
circumstances or possible worlds, or else formulate subjunctive conditionals of the form ‘Were a 
bridge like the Golden Gate Bridge to be dropped into an active volcano it would melt’ and 
determine their truth values, then (C) does not capture such cases. 
There is probably more to be said about this final probabilistic approach to possessing a 
potentiality to a degree. It is initially an intuitively compelling analysis, but capturing the likelihood
of a potentiality’s manifesting requires more than consideration of actual cases of manifestation.48 
The problem here is predominantly with those potentialities which are possessed to a low degree: 
the unactualized metaphysical possibilities such as the Golden Gate Bridge’s melting or its tasting 
of chocolate. We seem forced to take into consideration merely possible circumstances to give an 
account of these degrees, or else to resort to counterfactual or subjunctive conditionals of the kind 
which Strong Dispositionalism was intended to replace. A coherent explanation of the potentialities 
required to ground metaphysical necessity and possibility threatens to be circular.
The Strong Dispositionalist might respond that we should accept potentialities anyway as a
matter of brute fact, using counterfactuals or possible worlds merely as heuristic devices. However, 
this move loses her a key advantage over the modal realist. Moving from powers to potentialities 
which are possessed by degrees introduced an extra dimension to the nature of these entities, and 
the increased complexity of iterated potentialities further obscured what the members of this novel 
48 Vetter, op. cit. 2015, 71–74 appeals to worlds ‘as a heuristic device’ but the problem with the heuristic use of worlds
or counterfactual conditionals is that it never permits an explanation of what a potentiality’s being had to a degree 
is (only what it would be were there possible worlds, for instance).
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category are like. Now, the modal realist’s ontology of possibilia does not seem so obscure: we can 
understand what possible but non-actual spatio-temporal individuals would be like – at least we 
would know a talking donkey if we saw it – but we would not ordinarily recognise that an actual 
donkey instantiates the higher order potentiality to talk to a low degree.
Furthermore, if we accept that the degree of possession of a potentiality by an individual b 
is grounded by how individuals intrinsically similar to b behave when they instantiate that 
potentiality (even if these are restricted to actual individuals), then we have lost another key 
advantage of Strong Dispositionalism. The dispositional grounding of possibility is no longer a 
local matter; what a particular can and cannot do is determined by its potentialities, but the nature of
those potentialities – in particular, the degree to which b possesses them – depends upon the 
behaviour of individuals distinct from b. 
6. Conclusion 
What began as a parsimonious account of modality based on actual causal powers now requires an 
abundant ontology of potentialities which are largely isolated from experience. At worst, the 
enriched ontology of potentialities has made Strong Dispositionalism circular because their nature 
depends upon the entities or the conceptual apparatus they were postulated to replace. At best, 
Strong Dispositionalism seems destined to lose the advantage it claimed of giving a localized 
account of modality and has some difficult explanatory work still to do. If the strong dispositionalist
does not produce this explanation and requires us to accept potentiality by degrees as a matter of 
brute fact, then she loses another key advantage over the modal realist concerning the coherence 
and plausibility of her fundamental ontology. 
The promise of an actualist, naturalistic account of metaphysical possibility based on 
dispositional properties is attractive and not worth giving up on (yet). But, as I hope to have shown 
in the course of this paper, the ontological costs are much higher than first anticipated, and the 
ontology required may not be coherent at all. Furthermore, the increasing ontological complexity 
and specificity introduced in the course of the theoretical adjustments from powers to potentialities 
are reminiscent of the epicycles required to save Ptolemaic astronomy from refutation. The Strong 
Dispositionalist project is at risk of becoming what Lakatos would call a ‘degenerating’ research 
programme: fixing problems as they are found but not providing novel and useful explanations.49 
49 Imre Lakatos, ‘Science and Pseudoscience’, in G. Vesey, ed., Philosophy in the Open (London: Open University 
Press).  
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Nevertheless, if giving a comprehensive account of metaphysical modality proves futile, the 
dispositionalist can still lay claim to providing a plausible account of causal possibility and 
necessity; or else she could settle for giving a deflationary account of metaphysical modality, so the 
causal account is all that is required. I will leave these options open for consideration another time.50
50 I am grateful to the audience at the 2016 conference of the Vienna Forum for Analytic Philosophy (WFAP), 
especially to Graham Priest, and to Alastair Wilder for comments on this paper.
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